Carl von Clausewitz famously wrote, “war is a continuation of politics by other means.”
He meant by this that wars are conducted by political leaders making rational choices to achieve goals using war as a tool because other means are not as effective or efficient.
While choosing war might appear irrational, von Clausewitz was saying that even leaders we perceive to be madmen who start destructive, murderous wars still have in mind rational political objectives.
Thus, we should not pretend that Hitler or Hamas was irrational when they launched wars destined to rain down destruction upon their own people. Each was pursuing a calculated objective that they believed to be achievable with war.
Understanding this is key to recognizing that the reason why policies of appeasement fail is because capitulating to violence or threats of violence only encourages aggressors to see greater utility in war, not less.
Von Clausewitz also said, “war is the realm of chance . . . chance makes everything uncertain and interferes with the whole course of events. War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.”
Here, he reminds us that there are counterweights to the rational objectives of military adventures. These are happenstance, opportunity and sometimes dumb luck. The greatest danger of war is that we cannot know at the outset what turn of events will dictate the outcome. Which weapons will be most effective as the situation on the battlefield changes? Who might make the dumb decision at a critical moment? Might it be them or might it be us?
In war, assumptions about what the enemy will do or what he is capable of accomplishing very often lead to what are later realized to be foolish and even catastrophic mistakes. The Maginot line became a monument to backward-thinking.
Israeli hubris in 1973 and misplaced faith in a multi-billion-dollar technological safety net in 2023 left the country vulnerable to attack.
Russia and the US have each discovered that superiority in manpower or munitions can be countered by ingenuity, patience and motivated opponents from Vietnam to Afghanistan to Ukraine.
The uncertainty of war makes it that much more perilous, and the unpredictability of its outcome necessitates thinking about war not in terms of the best that can be achieved, but the worst of what might happen.
In the current conflict with Iran, the opening of a Houthi front is pure von Clausewitz. Iran knows the war is deeply unpopular in the United States and that the midterm elections are approaching. Iran sees that there is a large element in the Democratic party and a smaller one in the Republican party that is so obsessed with using the war to tar Donald Trump with its failure that they will go to extraordinary lengths to try to ensure that happens.
The recent, shocking opposition to the Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 illustrates this. The Iranians also realize that the American electorate just might be convinced to strengthen the hand of those who would gift them a reprieve from destruction and relief from sanctions if the Houthis can drive gas prices even higher. It is an entirely rational and very dangerous gambit.
The Iranians are, of course, just as vulnerable to the vagaries of chance as we are. Their proxy is shooting missiles at Riyadh and exposing the weakness of their enemies as they advance. What if their success suddenly culminated in something truly unexpected by either the Iranians or by those who think they are engaged merely in a domestic game for victory in the election?
It is important to remember that we do not always know what we think we know. In 1979, the US did not expect the Shah of Iran to fall. In 2021, we did not expect that the Taliban would immediately surge into Kabul and the Afghan government would collapse.
Events on the ground have a way of taking shape in ways that no one expects, which is precisely what von Clausewitz means by “chance.”
Imagine if Saudi Arabia should suddenly fall. The Houthis and the Iranians would be in control of vast Saudi oil reserves. Shiite Muslims would control Mecca and Medina, threatening a regional sectarian war unlike anything we have ever experienced.
Imagine too that in order to secure their gains the winning forces demand an American withdrawal and invite Russia or China to occupy bases on Saudi soil.
Far fetched? I admit that it might be as no one believes that the Houthis have such a capability or that the US would remain on the sidelines if they did. But the far fetched has become the actual many times in the past, which is why we cannot abide leaders who make policy without imagining the worst possible outcomes.
I am not about to argue that I am fan of Saudi Arabia. I am, however, willing to imagine what would happen if the Saudi regime was supplanted by one within the orbit of Iran, Russia or China. Considering the alternatives, it becomes easy to understand why the US must defend Saudi Arabia as we must defend our other allies.
Extending the authority to sanction Iran and Russia is not even close to military action against either of them or against the Houthis or the Chinese, but it is an act in defense of our allies, which makes the opposition to it outrageous.
War is politics by other means, but the war should not be in the House of Representatives. It is unconscionable for our leaders to appease Iran by attempting to sabotage the tools we need to fight a war, even an unpopular one, in pursuit of a win in November.
Failing to recognize the danger our enemies pose and foolishly behaving as though we will not suffer terrible consequences should things go horrifically awry is so crazy that those who voted against the sanctions act need to get their heads examined or voted out of Congress!
