Cascades of bad news in the war against Iran become good
news.
Take the first example: the assassination of the mass murderer, Khamenei, the “supreme leader” of Iran, on Feb. 28. Revealed by that act was his and Iran’s advance planning for layers of replacements. Not only for him, but for leaders of the Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and other major arms of the totalitarian regime in Iran. Bad news indeed. It is so much harder to eliminate the leadership of Iran’s totalitarian regime than anyone thought (“anyone” includes Trump and Netanyahu). The task was much steeper than imagined. Bad news indeed.
But it becomes good news. It reveals who the enemy is and who the additional targets are.
Raise this analysis up a conceptual notch. With each revelation of the scope of Iran’s power, previously unappreciated, the possibility of efeating this enemy becomes more realistic. The true scope of what needs to be done becomes clear. One cannot defeat an enemy one does not know.
Long range Iranian missiles
Another critical example. It seems that in the first two to three weeks of the war, it was thought that Iran’s capacity to launch missiles was severely degraded. American military leadership said so repeatedly.
But into the third week of the war, it turned out that this was not so. Iran kept firing missiles on Israel and other countries. Bad news indeed. But it becomes good news, revealing the unknown (or underappreciated) additional locations of Iran’s missiles and missile launchers.
It seems that in the early stages of the war, the US and Israel decimated Iran’s shorter range missiles, based on Iran’s coast. But Iran’s continuing capacity to launch missiles revealed the existence of, and locations of, longer-range missiles in Iran’s interior. The true scope of what needed to be done became clear.
In effect, the decimation of Iran’s shorter range missiles coerced it to use longer range missiles and thereby disclosed what and where they were. Good news.
This is wrenching. The “good news” was accompanied by Israeli civilians hit and killed or wounded by the longer range missiles, and by American soldiers killed or wounded. The good news comes at a bitter price that shames the term “good news,” which, however, remains a critical military necessity. An enemy cannot be defeated if the powers that the enemy possesses cannot be ascertained.
Strait of Hormuz
This brings us to the good news about the Strait of Hormuz. It begins with the bad news. The strait is topographically configured in such a way that Iran can easily attack any American or Israeli trying to take control of it. High hills face the strait on one side — hills in which it is easy for Iran to conceal drones and other weapons, which can be triggered from a distance. Very bad news.
Some of the water in the strait is shallow, forcing ships into narrow lanes of passages, making it easier for Iran to close these lanes, or to attack ships already within them. More bad news.
But the bad news becomes good news because, again, it provides the information necessary for the weapons or troops (or both) to move against Iranian control.
Lest it seem that this has been known all along, we must reach one of two conclusions:
It was only the war against Iran that disclosed the true dimensions of the challenges posed by the strait.
Or, as IJN columnist Jordan Friedman noted last week, leaders of the US and Europe have been asleep at the wheel for 47 years, never considering alternatives to an Iranian chokehold on the world’s energy supplies — never devising workarounds to the Strait of Hormuz.
Either way, the bad news inherent in the configuration of the Strait and Iran’s control over it is the realization, “Houston, we have a problem.” That’s good news. Taking the war as a whole — the bad news of Iran’s hold over the Strait, and of the number and range of Iran’s missiles — becomes good news. Without “know your enemy,” there is no way to defeat your enemy.
Still more, the war has made it clear that there is no way to deal with Iran other than to defeat it. Trump called for “unconditional surrender,” but Iran will not surrender. It can only be defeated.
I do not believe that Iran’s defeat must entail regime change. I do not support the destruction of targets that are not military assets. Beyond that, the defeat of Iran must entail the obliteration, using the word accurately and not boastfully, as Trump does, of every one of Iran’s military assets. Only this will protect the US, Israel and every country within range of Iran’s missiles and within the crosshairs of its sleeper cells around the world..
Iran’s defeat will also make it much more difficult for the regime to oppress its people.
Don’t say that Iran cannot be defeated. It can be done. It was done to Nazi Germany. It can be done to totalitarian Iran.
$4 gasoline
Another piece of bad news, which becomes good news: $4 for a gallon of gas.
No one wants that. But, by way of analogy, here’s the good news:
Coloradans are asked to water their lawn less due to the drought. I would like to enjoy nice green lawns around the city. But we are asked to make a sacrifice. Is it really a sacrifice?
Is it hard to balance less-than- green lawns against sufficient drinking water?
When the reason for the sacrifice is clear, and the dimension of the sacrifice is minor, is it really a sacrifice?
When American soldiers and Israelis soldiers and civilians put their lives on the line, they are doing so for the safety of free peoples around the world. Is it really the biggest sacrifice to pay $4 a gallon?
If my sacrifice for a war effort is another $1 a gallon, my contribution to the war effort is miniscule compared to other’s contribution; hardly worth the name “sacrifice.”
This is good news. I am not on the front, but I can relieve the pressure on the decision makers who should not have to taken into account $4 (or $5) gasoline to defeat an enemy, the dimensions of whose evil aspirations dwarf my small contribution to defeating them.
© IJN 2026
