Beware: Russia fights for her ‘sphere of influence’

I.

The editorial cartoons seeking to make sense of the recent war between Russia and Georgia invariably depict the proverbial Russian bear, devouring defenseless Georgia and, perhaps in the future, other small nations unfortunate enough to be situated along the Russian border.

The ravenous, fanged predator is an effective metaphor to employ, of course — and is in many ways perfectly true in this case — but it only tells one side of the story.

Most importantly, it leaves out the little guy — Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili — who, for a long time and against the wise counsel of his bigger friends, has been determinedly goading and kicking the aforesaid bear.

For reasons known perhaps only to him, Saakashvili seems to have missed that all-important class in Statecraft 101 about how it’s sometimes smarter not to rouse the neighborhood bully.

That said, make no mistake — Russia is indeed playing the role of bully, and is doing so in as dramatic and public a fashion as possible. It’s clear that Russia’s aggression is both intentional and designed for effect.

The intended audience is not, we think, limited to Georgia or to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the breakaway provinces with significant ethnic Russian populations that sparked the current crisis.

There are plenty of other ethnic and religious groupings along Russia’s historically flammable southern flank — some in Russia proper and some in the relatively new countries which gained independence after the collapse of the USSR — which are paying very close attention to current events in Georgia.

To those groupings, and to those nations which host some of them, the message being sent from Moscow is bluntly and abundantly clear: The bear might not be as fierce as it once was, but it remains fierce enough to assert its will when and where it pleases, and to do so in a catastrophic manner if it so chooses.

There are also messages being sent to the West, led by the US and EU, which seemed caught off guard by Russia’s recent moves.

While on the one hand encouraging nations like Georgia to become stronger democracies and close allies, the West has already made it clear that it has no intention of getting its feet dirty by actually defending them against Russia.

There is almost a quid-pro-quo dynamic here: Russia made no moves to prevent US action in Afghanistan and Iraq, in spite of those nations’ proximity to Russia, in an apparent acknowledgement of these conflicts as being within the West’s sphere of influence.

In return, the US and EU seem to be saying to Russia that they accept Georgia as being within Russia’s strategic backyard and are, therefore, giving the Russians a virtual green light, verbal protests notwithstanding.

Callous as such realpolitik thinking might seem, especially from Georgia’s perspective, it is nonetheless an effective means by which superpowers can coexist without resorting to the zero sum game of nuclear confrontation.

Where things might get dicey, however, is on Russia’s western flank, the old Iron Curtain satellite countries, which are now edging slowly but surely into the eager arms of the West.

Here, things are complicated by NATO memberships and pending memberships, and by US-sponsored missile defense systems, ostensibly for protecting Eastern Europe from missile attacks from Iran.

Some disturbingly apocalyptic scenarios loom on that horizon.

With the Georgia incursion, are the Russians merely flexing their muscles for show or embarking on a determined and prolonged course down the warpath?

With their success in Georgia, will Russia be emboldened about using military aggression in Eastern Europe, as one of its generals — speaking recently about Poland in particular — has already suggested?

Would the West stand idly by as our new European allies and their fledgling democracies are ravaged by the Russian army, and if not, how far would we be willing to go to defend them?

Tough questions all, and utterly impossible to answer from today’s vantage point, but that does nothing to diminish their importance. The West, under the leadership of the US, will have to carefully consider its options for response.

It will also have to give careful thought to the West’s role in Russia’s current behavior, for the two do not exist in a vacuum. Russia, still haunted by memories of Napoleon and Hitler, more often acts out of defensive motives than offensive ones, and this may remain true in today’s situation.

Has the West’s eagerness to place sophisticated weaponry in Eastern Europe revived the old Russian fears of foreign invasion? Did our enthusiastic support of Georgia’s membership in NATO add fuel to that fire? Have American actions in Iraq and Afghanistan convinced Russia’s leadership that the US is bent on using military means to expand our international power base?

We do not necessarily reply “yes” to any of those questions, but believe that they must at least be considered, in the conviction that many if not most Russians probably feel exactly that way.

The West must be resolute and courageous in responding to what might very well be the rebirth of the Cold War, but also must leave no stone unturned in seeking to prevent that unwelcome eventuality from coming to pass. The potential consequences are too dire to do otherwise.