Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his cabinet voted not to establish a state commission of inquiry into Hamas’ Oct. 7, 2023 attack on Israel.
This is wrong.
This is dangerous.
It is wrong because the public deserves to know who was responsible, and those responsible need to resign.
Clearly, it does not take a commission to know that Netanyahu was, at the least, partly responsible. This is because he was prime minister. Oct. 7 happened on his watch. Others — many others — may have been responsible, too; but when you’re in charge, “the buck stops here,” as Harry S Truman put it.
It is dangerous not to establish a commission because, without a thorough investigation into the mistakes that were made, some or all of these mistakes can be made again — endangering Israel.
In Netanyahu’s defense, two points may be offered.
The first point is Netanyahu’s position that a state commission of inquiry should not be “politically biased” against him. He is right. However, this is a circular argument. Any commission will be deemed by Netanyahu to be “politically biased” because the findings of the commission will be, in part, predictable. Even if he is deemed not directly responsible for the errors, the findings will not reflect well on him because he was the head of state on Oct. 7.
At a minimum, a state commission of inquiry will find that it was on Netanyahu’s watch that:
• Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad overran IDF positions and attacked numerous Israeli communities;
• IDF’s chain of command broke down;
• Israel materially aided Hamas for years for Oct. 7, deluding itself about Hamas;
• Israeli intelligence broke down as the Hamas attack loomed.
All this is known. It is difficult to imagine a state commission of inquiry finding Netanyahu entirely free of blame of all of this, especially for aiding Hamas for years. Netanyahu knows this.
The second point in Netanyahu’s defense is that he has responded to the failures of Oct. 7 with fortitude and vision. Israel’s heroic soldiers could destroy Hamas’ battalions, most of its command structure and some 20,000 Hamas fighters because of Netanyahu’s backbone. He stood up to the Biden administration, which impeded Israel’s response almost every step of the way. This didn’t stop Netanyahu. Also because of Netanyahu’s backbone, Israel decided to destroy Hezbollah when the US pressured Netanyahu not to.
All true. All admirable. And all irrelevant. Netanyahu’s post-Oct. 7 leadership does not excuse him from his pre-Oct. 7 failures on either moral grounds or security grounds — the delay in discovering the failures in Israel’s pre-Oct. 7 military operations and “concept.”
The war against Hamas is now more than one-and-a-half years old — long past the time when the findings of a commission could bolster Israel’s security. Netanyahu’s promise to establish a commission of inquiry the “day after” the war ends cannot be postponed forever.
It is important to state what a “state commission of inquiry” is.
It can summon witnesses. It can collect evidence. It can make recommendations about the individuals under investigation. It can highlight necessary changes in IDF strategy, operations and thinking.
Following the debacle of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, a state commission of inquiry found the IDF Chief of Staff, David Elazar, primarily responsible. Specific recommendations improved the IDF. PrimeMinister Golda Meir was not found culpable, but she resigned anyway on the grounds that if you’re in charge, you’re responsible.
This importance of acknowledgement of responsibility seems to be lost on Netanyahu, costing him support among his friends and sharpening the opposition among his opponents.
Other top IDF and intelligence leaders have stepped up and taken responsibility. It is time for Netanyahu to do so, too, by, at a minimum, establishing a state commission of inquiry into Oct. 7.
© IJN 2025
