The ceasefire agreement with Hamas has been characterized as a “deal with the devil.” Of course it is. If they were angels there would be no need for a deal.
At the moment that Emily Damari, Romi Gonen and Doron Steinbrecher were visible inside a Hamas vehicle on Jan. 19, rational analysis of the agreement that was about to set them free was impossible.
The only feelings were tension and anticipation while Hamas filmed a propaganda video of its “victory.” Terrorist thugs, clad in soldiers’ fatigues that were new and clean since they were never worn in battle, stood in formation amidst a throng of supporters surging toward the Israeli hostages.
“Hurry up” was my only thought as I hoped they could persevere just a short while longer to escape the crowd. Then, at last, there was elation knowing that the three women were back with their families and upon seeing the images of them being hugged and rejoicing in their freedom.
Only then, once the euphoria of those few hours passed, could a sickening reckoning with the terms of the ceasefire agreement begin.
To get these hostages home Israel had to agree to repeat the mistake that put Yahya Sinwar back on the battlefield years ago. Scores of terrorists and their accomplices were released from Israeli custody that same day with hundreds more to come.
Gaza’s residents started to return to their homes with Hamas mixed among them, smuggling its weapons and reasserting its control on the streets.
In exchange, Israel receives only the promise that perhaps the remaining Israeli hostages, living and dead, will come home too.
On the surface, it’s such a bad deal for Israel that one has to wonder why Benjamin Netanyahu would agree to it.
To add to the drama, it is notable that no one expects the ceasefire to hold. Even Donald Trump, who swiftly claimed credit for getting the deal done before he took the oath of office, admitted he is not confident that the agreement will see all of its conditions fulfilled. Frankly, I doubt that he cares if it does. The President’s sole concern was to make sure that he appeared to do something that Joe Biden could not, and he surely did not want to have to find a way to make “hell to pay” an actionable policy.
Biden also claimed credit for the ceasefire, saying that the deal was exactly the same as the one that he outlined in May, 2024. If it really is the same deal, then the advantage to agreeing to it on Trump’s timeline is possibly to curry favor with Trump by assisting his slap in Biden’s face, or possibly the reward of lifting Biden-era actions against Israel like the holdback of 2,000-pound bombs and the sanctions that had been imposed on West Bank settlers.
Ending funding for UNRWA and re-imposing sanctions on the International Criminal Court are also Israeli priorities that Trump quickly made into policy rewards.
While these concessions are not meaningless, it’s hard to believe that Netanyahu would sell himself so cheaply if he thought the war would truly end.
Hamas’ acquiescence in exchange for vague promises of an eventual Israeli withdrawal to be negotiated later likewise signal that it views the arrangement as temporary. Its show of force during the hostage release and on the streets after the ceasefire began is evidence that it feels a need to prove it still controls Gaza.
Hamas benefitted from the war on the world stage, but it has to be worried about the swiftness of Bashar Assad’s ouster combined with the weakening of Hezbollah and Iran. It sorely needs to move above ground to counter any potential challenge to its rule.
All involved have their reasons for coming to an agreement with drawn-out terms that each party hopes to exploit to its advantage. Hamas will want to keep up its end of the bargain long enough to reassert their authority throughout Gaza and to figure out how to rebuild their supply lines with Iranian assistance seemingly more distant.
The remaining hostages are their leverage to make sure Israel does not interfere too much with that process. For Israel, the ceasefire will allow time to make its enhanced military presence in Gaza more permanent with the expectation that the full withdrawal phase will never happen.
The most likely outcome of the deal is a return to the status quo ante of the war with changes only to the landscape of the battlefield, but as bleak as that prospect might be, agreeing to the ceasefire also creates a remote possibility of change.
If an alternative to Hamas is going to emerge in Gaza, it is unlikely to be through diplomacy or continued Israeli military action. The best hope for change is from Gazans themselves if they finally have had enough of the chaos wrought upon them by Hamas to act against it.
For years to come, they will be reliant upon intermittent foreign aid if UNRWA remains disrupted, which will be coupled with a massive reconstruction project even if Hamas does not divert building materials to its own purposes.
Only when the people of Gaza are exhausted by Hamas forcing them to endure privation in pursuit of pointless violent escapades will they finally rally around a different flag.
Given the history of the conflict, counting on war-weariness in Gaza as an ally is certainly a longshot, but no less so than the notion of achieving total victory over a territory that Israel cannot govern on its own or imagining that a mythical Palestinian state ruled by Hamas murderers will make peace.
In any event, a ceasefire that is so evidently designed to never be fully implemented is not meant to bring peace. It is designed merely as an opportunity for each side to shape what the war will look like months or years down the road.
My cynicism is not a message of hope, but what more can one expect from a deal with the devil?
